Michigan Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 8

1961

Negligence - Interspousal Tort Immunity - Action by Wife Against
Deceased Husband's Estate
Charles E. Voltz
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles E. Voltz, Negligence - Interspousal Tort Immunity - Action by Wife Against Deceased Husband's
Estate, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1263 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss8/9

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1961]

RECENT DECISIONS

1263

NEGLIGENCE - INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY -ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST

When the automobile driven by plaintiff's
husband collided with another vehicle, plaintiff's husband was killed and
she was seriously injured and rendered mentally incompetent. Plaintiff's
guardian brought a negligence action for her injuries against the other
driver, who im.pleaded the administrator of her husband's estate as a thirdparty defendant. The trial court denied administrator's pre-trial motion
for summary judgment,1 and subsequently entered judgment against the
administrator. On certification, held, affirmed. The doctrine of tort immunity between spouses is based on a policy of preserving domestic peace
and harmony and preventing fraudulent collusion against insurance companies, and does not apply where death dissolves the marital relationship
and eliminates the opportunity for collusion. Long v. Landy, 171 A.2d 1
(N.J. 1961).
At common law neither husband nor wife could sue the other for
tortious conduct.2 The historical basis for the doctrine lies in a combination
of substantive and procedural reasonss rooted in the concept of the legal
unity of husband and wife.4 Although this concept is now generally
recognized as a fiction,11 justification for the doctrine is usually found in
the public policy against disrupting domestic harmony by litigation
between man and wife. 6 The most significant departure from the doctrine
of interspousal tort immunity came with the passage of the Married
Women's Acts, which were enacted primarily to create or recognize a
DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE -

1Long v. Landy, 60 N.J. Super. 362, 158 A.2d 728 (1960).
2 Phillips v. Barnet, I Q.B.D. 436 (1876); see PROSSER, Toa'IS § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
8 See PROSSER, note 2 supra, and McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 48 HARV, L. REv. 1031 (1930).
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •442, •448; 2 id. •483; See generally Williams, The
Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, IO Mon. L. REv. 16 (1947).
II See influential dissent of Pound, J., in Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656
(1927).
o Although the domestic tranquility argument is decisive in most courts today, it
does not seem as compelling as it apparently was in 1858 when the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated, "The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would
consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of
universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and
murders." Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858).
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substantive right in the wife to her separate property interests; many
of these statutes permitted a wife to sue in her own behalf to protect
these interests. Most courts today agree that the acts which allowed her
the right to sue served to negate both the legal unity concept and the
domestic harmony policy, at least in regard to property tort actions.7
Furthermore, many of these acts were written in broad language which
appeared to authorize a wife to bring any legal action which could be
brought by a single woman.8 Although such statutes might have been
construed to allow a wife's personal injury action against her husband, the
prevailing view has been that these acts were not intended to give a wife a
right which even her husband did not have at common law.o Thus in
almost two-thirds of our states today one spouse still may not sue the
other for a personal tort.10 A growing minority of jurisdictions have become dissatisfied with the logic and results of the doctrine and reject it
entirely.11 Where the majority rule prevails, however, an action for a
personal tort committed during marriage is prohibited even after the
marriage relationhip has been disrupted by separation,12 desertion,13
divorce,1 4 or annulment.15 Even in the case of the death of one spouse,
the courts which subscribe to the interspousal immunity doctrine generally
deny a spouse's personal tort action against the estate of the deceased
7 For an analysis of the provisions of state statutes, see McCurdy, Personal Injury
Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 310-13 (1959). See further 3 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 180 (1935).
8 E.g., "Married women shall have power .•• to sue separately ••. for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.•.." D. C. CODE ANN.
§ 30-208 (1951).
9The leading case is Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), interpreting the
forerunner of the District of Columbia statute quoted supra note 7. For a collection of
cases for other jurisdictions, see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARv. L. REv. 1031 (1930); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
10 PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
11 Most of the jurisdictions that reject the doctrine have done so by a liberal interpretation of the Married Women's Acts. These courts find no basis for distinguishing
property tort from personal tort actions on the basis of the legal unity doctrine or the
policy of preserving domestic harmony. E.g., Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
A few jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine via express statute: N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw §
57; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1959); Wrs. STAT. § 246.07-.075 (1957). Contra, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); see N.Y. INs. LAw § 167 (3) which exempts the
insurer from indemnifying the insured spouse for a tort committed on the other spouse
unless a provision expressly covering this liability is inserted into the policy.
12 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Holman v. Holman,
73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945).
13 Clark v. Clark, 11 F.2d 871 (S.D. N.Y. 1925) (semble), a[J'd per curiam, 11 F.2d 871
(2d Cir. 1926).
14 Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956); Abbott v. Abbott, 67
Me. 304 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Strom v. Strom,
98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Schultz
v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911). Contra, Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d
670 (La. App. 1954) (semble).
15 Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d
445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Contra, Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896);
cf. Watson v. Watson, 39 Cal. 2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952).
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spouse.10 The jurisdiction of the principal case is committed to the majority
rule and would deny the action if the husband were still living.17 If the
rule rests solely on the policy of preserving domestic tranquility, the result
in the principal case follows logically from the given facts. However,
other considerations may be found to support the doctrine and provide
a basis for continuing the immunity, at least in modified form, even after
the death of one spouse.
One consideration is the danger that the surviving spouse will press
false claims upon the deceased spouse's estate. If the decedent's estate is
to be liable for torts arising out of the marriage, the surviving spouse might
well be tempted by liability insurance1 S or estate assetst9 to file suit for
all manner of hurts and annoyances20 suffered during marriage. The
possibility that many claims would be invalid or fraudulent is enhanced by
the prevailing rule that the statute of limitations does not run between
husband and wife during coverture,21 thus presenting the problem of fraud
associated with stale claims.22 Furthermore, although the surviving spouse,
like any other plaintiff, has the burden of proof, the temptation to offer
perjured testimony is greatest when the claim is difficult to disprove.2 s
16 In re Estate of Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Wilson v. Brown, 154
S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Keister's Adm'r v. Keister•s Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315
(1918); Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d 335 (1949). Contra, Johnson v. Peoples
First Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958); Brower v. Webb, 5 D. &
C.2d 193 (C.P. Phila. 1955); Bodnar v. Herley, 47 Berks. 31 (C.P. Pa. 1954); cf. Apitz v.
Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P .2d 585 (1955) (intentional tort); Ennis v. Truhitte, 306
S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) (willful and wanton negligence): Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336
S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (child against parent); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184
Atl. 663 (1936) (wrongful death action by parent of wife against deceased husband's
estate).
17 Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
18 "[A] raid upon an insurance company" would be the only reason a wife would
want to sue her husband for a negligent tort. Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 241, 196
N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1922); see Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, 53 A.2d 515 (1947);
Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d 387
(Sup. Ct. 1939), afj'd, 258 App. Div. 603, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1940); Villaret v. Villaret, 169
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948). However, "automobile liability policies often exclude from
coverage ••• liability to members of the household••••" VANCE, INSURANCE § 196 (3d ed.
1951).
19 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877); cf. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294
N.W. 33 (1940).
20 See Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (injunction against nagging
denied); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (dissent) (discussing the prob•
lem of an excessively kissed wife).
21 E.g., Morris v. Pennsgrove Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 Atl. 16
(1934).
22 "They [statutes of limitations] were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties
from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence which
would show that such rights never existed••••" Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342,
349 (1874).
23 See In the Matter of the Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 392, 125 P.2d 354, 357
(1942): "What about the jeopardy to the interests of other heirs .•. if a widow were
permitted to set up old claims against her husband, supported only by her own averments
and which the other heirs would frequently have no means of disproving?"
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Although the dead man statutes would probably preclude the injured
spouse from testifying herself,24 a person who would be willing to commit
perjury in the first place would also be tempted to suborn a third person
to swear falsely. 25 Nevertheless, "there is opportunity for fraud and collusion in many legal proceedings, but our system of courts and juries is
very well designed to seek them out and its presence clearly furnishes no
just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions."26
A more fundamental reason for denying liability for torts which occur
in the ordinary course of marital activity is presented by the special nature
of interspousal conduct. Since such conduct rests on a basis entirely
different from that of the typical tort situation, conduct which might be
tortious between persons not husband and wife should be distinguished
from similar conduct between spouses.27 At least two differentiating
characteristics are ascertainable: the attitudes of precaution existing between
husband and wife, and the sharing of risk among members of a family
unit. Although marriage is generally thought to increase the responsibilities
between a man and woman, the familiarity which develops between husband
and wife might result in a less cautious attitude toward each other than
would be taken toward a stranger. For example, a person may expose his
spouse to the same hazards he takes himself, regardless of whether this
is more or less caution than would be taken if third parties were involved.
Rather than indicating a lack of respect for the safety of one's spouse, this
attitude can be said to flow from the close identity of personalities and
interests implicit in the marital relationship. Closely related to this
unique concept of care between spouses is the element of risk-sharing in
the conduct of the marital enterprise.28 Since the affairs of the modem
family are typically conducted on a joint basis, the wife is no longer
restricted to the role of a junior partner. The common interests of
husband and wife should require that each bear the ordinary risks as
well as the benefits of activities undertaken for marital purposes. These
two distinguishing characteristics of interspousal conduct provide a basis
for limiting the application of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine to
situations in which the negligence does not consist of an extreme departure
from ordinary standards of care, and the activity arises out of and in the
24 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
25 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1954).
26 Koplik. v. C. P. Trucking Co., 27 N.J. 1, 15,

141 A.2d 34, 42 (1958) (dissent); see
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395,
403, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (1938).
27 See McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 338
(1959). But see Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 314, 287 P.2d 572, 584 (1955): "We are not
disposed to carve out the area within which actions for negligence should be allowed, or
that other area in which the intimacy of the family relationship forbids recovery by the
spouses."
28 See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1031,
1055 (1930); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956);
Comment, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 610 (1956).
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course of the marital relation. Thus, if a wife negligently prepares the
family dinner so that her husband becomes seriously ill, or if a husband
injures his wife by negligently driving his automobile in his haste to get his
wife to the grocery store before closing hours, there should be no liability
even if the tortfeasor spouse has died. Although each of the suggested
qualifications to the immunity doctrine presents difficulties in application,
the courts have considerable experience with similar problems in other
contexts. For example, in delimiting what activity arises out of and in
the course of the marital relationship, the courts can look to their experience with an analogous provision in the workmen's compensation
statutes2 0 or the "family purpose" doctrine of vicarious liability for automobile accidents.a 0 Similarly, to determine what conduct constitutes an
extreme departure from ordinary care3 1 the courts could develop concepts
similar to those employed to interpret automobile guest statutes which
limit liability to guest passengers for gross negligence, or willful, wanton
and reckless conduct.32 In spite of the difficulties which would be encountered in applying these standards, a doctrine of qualified interspousal
tort immunity presents a reasonable alternative to the complete acceptance
or rejection of the common law doctrine.
Charles E. Voltz

§§ 6.00-29.20 (1952).
generally Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MICH. L.
REv. 846 (1928).
31 See classic definition of gross negligence by Rugg, C.J., in Altman v. Aronson, 231
Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505 (1919).
32 See generally Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. Cmc. L. REv. 24 (1937).
20

1

LARSON, WoRitMEN'S COMPENSATION

30 See

